Hazard Analysis and resulting Starting Point Hazard for ROSA
GUNTHER ; HERR ; GEISLER ; PUTTNER ; AMMAD ; BEN AOUN ; KLINGE ; LEMAIRE ; SCHUTTE
Type de document
RAPPORT DE RECHERCHE
Langue
anglais
Auteur
GUNTHER ; HERR ; GEISLER ; PUTTNER ; AMMAD ; BEN AOUN ; KLINGE ; LEMAIRE ; SCHUTTE
Résumé / Abstract
Today, rail transport is considered as the safest overland mode of transport in France as well as in Germany, the existing functional and procedural safety concepts in railway undertakings are historically grown. Now there exists a complex set of rules and regulations as well as a specific railway technology. However, a complete analysis has not been carried out on any level of rail transport which would have established a logical, causal and mathematical correlation between the safety of individual components and procedures and the safety indicators and their rule of precedence. The scope of ROSA is to map the actual standard of safety on a railway network in Europe and to enable the duplication of the structure of Analysis on further networks. This claim requires a generic foundation for all kind of safety related definitions and analysis in order to facilitate an agreement of the ROSA project partner in France and Germany. The aim of work package WP1 consists of methodically and fully correlating the different levels of safety considerations existing in railways. It is, in particular, a question of analytically linking the accident events (e.g. collision) with generic hazard or threats as potential causes (e.g. insufficient braking distance). This deliverable describes the structure of a generic hazard analysis which is harmonised with existing (non-generic) hazard analysis of other European railway network 2. The PHA in form of a Fault Tree links the hazards with its causes. The generic approach refers to a basic railway system within the defined ROSA system boundaries 2with only a few barriers predicated upon physical and/or basical attributes of the railway system. For the detailed information about the ROSA Model and the Basic System Model see 2. The ROSA hazard analysis covers all those hazards, which remain uncovered in the basic railway system. Based on this generic hazard analysis, the ROSA partners agreed on a harmonised list of detailed but still generic hazards. These so-called Starting Point Hazards (SPH) are described in detail in order to prepare further examinations concerning the generic evolution of the Starting Point Hazards. Therefore, the Starting Point Hazards serve for initial points for the following Consequence Analysis., RAPPORT DE CONTRAT
